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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Tyler Kelly Vanslyke appeals from the Amended Restitution Order ordering him 
to pay $7,834.77 in restitution. Mr. Vanslyke asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion when it ordered $7,834.77 in restitution. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Jeffrey Cundiff and Justin Galloway reported the theft of a large number of goose 
decoys, two boats, ammunition and other sporting equipment from the property they 
leased for hunting purposes. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.1.) 
Donovan Lantz, the owner of the property, also had hunting equipment stolen from the 
property. 1 (Tr., p.8, Ls.15-25, p.9, L.20 - p.12, L.4.) 
Canyon County Detective Bish received information that Mr. Vanslyke and 
Eric Kiser were responsible for the theft. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Vanslyke subsequently 
admitted to detectives that he and Mr. Kiser went to the property intending to take the 
decoys. (PSI, p.2.) At Mr. Vanslyke's residence, detectives located much of the stolen 
equipment. (PSI, p.2.) The remaining stolen equipment, such as the boats, was 
located at the residence of Mr. Kiser's father. (PSI, p.2.) 
Mr. Vanslyke was charged with one count of grand theft, in violation of I.C. §§ 18-
2403(1) and 18-2407(1 )(b). (R., pp.14-15.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Mr. Vanslyke agreed to plead guilty to an amended charge of one count of burglary, in 
violation of I.C. § 18-1401. (R., pp.20-24.) The district court entered a withheld 
1 The hunting and sporting equipment stolen from the property will be referred to in this 
brief as "the stolen equipment." 
1 
judgment and placed Mr. Vanslyke on three years of probation. (R., pp.25-28, 38-40.) 
The district court also ordered Mr. Vanslyke to pay restitution in the amount of 
$1,057.92 to Mr. Galloway. (R., pp.30-31.) 
Meanwhile, State Farm Insurance (hereinafter, State Farm) had paid Mr. Lantz 
and Mr. Galloway insurance benefits on the stolen equipment before the stolen 
equipment was recovered. (Tr., p.17, Ls.5-7 (Mr. Lantz); Tr., p.93, Ls.8-19 
(Mr. Galloway).) After the stolen equipment was recovered, State Farm gave Mr. Lantz 
and Mr. Galloway the opportunity to reclaim the stolen equipment. (Tr., p.116, Ls.12-
18.) Mr. Lantz and Mr. Galloway chose not to reclaim the stolen equipment, because 
they would have had to reimburse State Farm for what they took back. (Tr., p.116, L.19 
- p.117, L.1.) State Farm sold the recovered stolen equipment at a public auction, 
where Mr. Cundiff and Mr. Galloway purchased some of the recovered items. (Tr., p.69, 
Ls.1-18, p.96, Ls.8-9, p.104, Ls.1-15, p.117, Ls.2-3; , pp.90-92.) Mr. Galloway bought 
the items he purchased at the auction for less money than he received for those items 
from State Farm. (Tr., p.104, Ls.11-15.) 
The district court later ordered Mr. Vanslyke to pay restitution in the amount of 
$7,276.85 to Mr. Lantz, Mr. Galloway, and State Farm. (R., pp.43-44.) The district 
court then filed an amended restitution order, supplanting the previously entered 
restitution orders and ordering Mr. Vanslyke to pay restitution in the amount of 
$7,834.77 to Mr. Lantz, Mr. Galloway, and State Farm. (R., pp.69-70.) 
Mr. Vanslyke filed an Objection to and Motion for Relief from Order of Restitution, 
challenging the amended restitution order. (R., pp.100-02.) The district court 
conducted a restitution hearing and heard testimony from Mr. Lantz, Mr. Cundiff, 
Mr. Galloway, Mr. Vanslyke, and Todd Collins, a fire claim representative at State Farm. 
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(Tr., p.5, p.109, Ls.19-24.) The district court ordered the parties to submit additional 
briefing. (R., p.105.) 
After the parties submitted additional briefing (R., pp.106-20), the district court 
provided an oral ruling on the issue of restitution. (R., p.121.) The district court, in an 
Amended Restitution Order, ordered Mr. Vanslyke to pay restitution in the amount of 
$7,834.77 to Mr. Galloway, Mr. Lantz, and State Farm. (R., pp.122-23.) The restitution 
was joint and several with any of Mr. Vanslyke's co-defendants. (R., p.123.) 




Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered $7,834.77 in restitution? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered $7,834.77 In Restitution 
Mr. Vanslyke asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it ordered 
$7,834.77 in restitution. The district court ordered restitution in the following amounts: 
(1) $1,057.92 to Mr. Galloway; (2) $500.00 to Mr. Lantz; (3) $4,224.06 to State Farm, on 
Mr. Lantz's claim; and (4) $2,052.79 to State Farm, on Mr. Galloway's claim. 
(R., p.123.) Mr. Vanslyke disputes the amounts of restitution ordered to State Farm on 
Mr. Lantz's claim and on Mr. Galloway's claim. 
The district court in this case based the amount of restitution ordered to State 
Farm on the actual cash value of the stolen equipment. The actual cash value was 
calculated by State Farm. However, the law requires a district court to base the amount 
of restitution ordered on the market value of stolen property. Because the district court 
did not base the amount of restitution ordered to State Farm on the market value of the 
stolen equipment, it abused its discretion. 
"The decision whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the 
discretion of a trial court, guided by consideration of the factors set forth in I.C. § 19-
5304(7) and by the policy favoring full compensation to crime victims who suffer 
economic loss." State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687, 692 (Ct. App. 2007). The amount of 
economic loss to be awarded is based on the preponderance of evidence submitted to 
the district court by the prosecutor, defendant, victim, or presentence investigator. 
I.C. § 19-5304(6). "The determination of the amount of restitution is a question of fact 
for the trial court whose findings will not be disturbed if supported by substantial 
evidence." Smith, 144 Idaho at 692. "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence 
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." State v. 
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Vargas, 152 Idaho 240, 243 (Ct. App. 2012). Appellate courts "will not overturn an 
order of restitution unless an abuse of discretion is shown." Smith, 144 Idaho at 692. 
Review of a district court's discretionary decision involves a multi-tiered inquiry to 
determine (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; 
(2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) 
whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. 
In determining the amount of restitution to be ordered, a district court "shall 
consider the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense, 
the financial resources, needs and earning ability of the defendant, and such other 
factors as the court deems appropriate." I.C. § 19-5304(7). Restitution may only be 
ordered "for any economic loss which the victim actually suffers." I.C. § 19-5304(2). 
Economic loss "includes, but is not limited to, the value of property taken, destroyed, 
broken, or otherwise harmed .... " I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a). For purposes of restitution, 
the definition of "value" is the same as the definition in the theft statutes. I.C. § 19-
5304(1 )(c); State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 267 (Ct. App. 2010). Thus, "value means 
the market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if such cannot be 
satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a reasonable 
time after the crime." I. C. § 18-2402(11 )(a); Smith, 144 Idaho at 692. The Idaho Court 
of Appeals has held that, "generally, the 'market value' of consumer goods is the 
reasonable price at which the owner would hold those goods out for sale to the general 
public, as opposed to the 'cost of replacement' which would be the cost for the owner to 
reacquire the same goods." Smith, 144 Idaho at 693. 
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Here, the district court, when determining the restitution owed by Mr. Vanslyke, 
was permitted to consider the value of any property stolen by Mr. Vanslyke, and was to 
calculate the value of that property according to its "market value," so long as that value 
could be satisfactorily ascertained. See id. Thus, the question is whether there was 
either (1) substantial evidence that the amount of restitution ordered to State Farm was 
the market value of the stolen equipment, or, failing that, (2) substantial evidence that 
the market value of the stolen equipment could not be satisfactorily ascertained. 
A. Substantial Evidence Did Not Establish That The Amount Awarded To State 
Farm Is The Market Value Of The Stolen Equipment 
Mr. Vanslyke asserts that there is no substantial evidence from which the district 
court could find that the amount of restitution ordered to State Farm is the market value 
of the stolen equipment. Thus, the district court abused its discretion by not acting 
consistently with the applicable legal standards. 
State Farm paid Mr. Lantz $5,145.66 in benefits on his claim. (R., 51.) State 
Farm received $921.60 from the auction of the recovered stolen equipment and credited 
that figure to Mr. Lantz's claim, (R., pp.52-54), and so reduced its requested amount of 
restitution on Mr. Lantz's claim to $4,224.06, (Tr. p.139, Ls.13-25). Additionally, State 
Farm paid Mr. Galloway $2,052.79 in benefits on his claim. (R., pp.62, 66.) State 
Farm's requested amount of restitution on Mr. Galloway's claim was $2,052.79. 
(R., p.62.) The district court ordered Mr. Vanslyke to pay the exact amounts of 
restitution State Farm requested. (R., p.123.) 
State Farm's payments, and thus the restitution ordered to State Farm, were 
based on State Farm's calculation of the "actual cash value" of the stolen equipment 
claimed by Mr. Lantz and Mr. Galloway. (See Tr., p.115, Ls.17-23.) The actual cash 
7 
value of property is calculated by taking the replacement value of the property and 
subtracting depreciation for the age or condition of the property. (See Tr., p.125, Ls.8-
17; p.137, Ls.9-11.) The replacement value of property is submitted to State Farm by 
the insured. (Tr., p.135, Ls.21-23.) State Farm then evaluates the submitted 
replacement value for accuracy. (Tr., p.136, Ls.3-8.) Afterwards, State Farm takes 
depreciation for the property. (See Tr., p.136, Ls. 13-17.) 
Here, State Farm submitted documentation showing the actual cash value it 
calculated for the stolen equipment. (R., pp.55-57 (contents inventory summary for 
Mr. Lantz's claim); pp.63-65 (contents inventory summary for Mr. Galloway's claim).) 
However, the actual cash value of property does not necessarily equal the market 
value. 2 In this case, substantial evidence did not establish that the actual cash value is 
the market value of the stolen equipment. 
In cases where the Idaho Court of Appeals has concluded that there was 
sufficient evidence for the market value of stolen property, it has relied upon testimony 
or other evidence showing the price at which the stolen property would be held out for 
2 In a case involving a restitution order for a stolen used scaffold, the Court of Appeals 
of Kansas decided that "straight-line depreciation," similar to the approach used by 
State Farm to derive actual cash value, does not itself establish the "fair market value" 
of the used scaffold: 
[The defendant] argues that the court should apply a straight-line 
depreciation schedule to the scaffold. He reasons that if it had a useful life 
of 20 years and was 16 years old at the time of the theft, its value was 
only 20% of its original cost. Anyone who has sold a new car a few 
months after its original purchase will confirm that straight-line 
depreciation is not always an accurate measure of fair market value. The 
buyer who paid $2,032,000 for the 1699 "The Lady Tennant" Stradivarius 
violin in 2005 certainly did not think so. Depreciation is a factor to be 
considered, but it does not trump the ultimate test: the fair market value of 
the item in an arm's-length sale. 
State v. Baxter, 118 P.3d 1291, 1293 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005). 
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sale to the general public. For example, in a theft case involving whether used pipe 
stolen from a farm exceeded $1,000 in market value, such that the defendant could be 
convicted of grand theft, the district court heard testimony from "the owner of a company 
engaged in the business of selling new and used pipe." Vargas, 152 Idaho at 243-44. 
The company owner in Vargas, who owned the company that reinstalled the stolen 
used pipe, "clearly testified that when used pipe is available he can generally sell it for 
60 percent of the price of equivalent new pipe. He testified about the price he would 
pay for the used pipe at issue (slightly over $200 per ten-foot section) and what he 
would charge for the pipe on re-sale (slightly over $300 per ten-foot section)." Id. 
Because there were nineteen sections of stolen pipe, the court concluded that "under 
either measure there was sufficient evidence that the market value of the pipe exceeded 
$1,000." Id. at 244. 
Similarly, in Smith, supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals decided that "the district 
court did not err in calculating the amount of restitution owed for the property stolen by 
[the defendant] by using the ascerlained retail value of that property." Smith, 144 Idaho 
at 693 (emphasis added). The court's use of the phrase "ascertained retail value" 
implies that the parties in Smith presented evidence by which the district court could 
know or ascertain the retail value of the stolen property, and thereby derive the market 
value. 
In this case, there was no evidence presented to show that the actual cash value 
of the stolen equipment is "the reasonable price at which the owner would hold those 
goods out for sale to the general public" - the market value of the stolen equipment. 
See Smith, 144 Idaho at 693. For example, Mr. Lantz did not testify as to the market 
value of the stolen equipment on his claim. While Mr. Lantz testified that his used 
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trolling motor would be worth $325 at a shop, (Tr., p.37, L.23 - p.38, L.3), he based that 
testimony (and the $306.34 replacement value he submitted to State Farm) on 
"Cabela's catalog price." (Tr., p.36, Ls.15-23; R., p.93.) Testimony by Mr. Collins 
indicated that the replacement value for property is for a "brand new" replacement. 
(See Tr., p.122, Ls.3-15.) Because the motor was used, (Tr., p.36, L.24 - p.37, L.2), it 
cannot be said that Mr. Lantz's testimony about the price for a new motor at a shop or in 
Cabela's catalog (the replacement value) established the price that this particular used 
motor would have been held out for sale to the general public (the market value). 
Mr. Lantz later agreed that, as a general rule, brand new decoys cost more than used 
decoys. (Tr., p.40, Ls.15-19.) Under that reasoning, it would follow that a new motor 
would cost more than a used motor. Thus, the testimony on the replacement value of 
the motor, even bearing in mind State Farm accepted $306.34 as the actual cash value 
of the motor, did not establish the market value of the used motor. 
The rest of Mr. Lantz's testimony did not deal with the price at which the rest of 
the stolen equipment would have been held out for sale to the general public. Mr. Lantz 
testified that all of his stolen equipment was used. (Tr., p.37, Ls.3-6.) To prove the 
value of the stolen equipment, Mr. Lantz would have had to give testimony on the 
market value of the stolen equipment as used, because "value means the market value 
of the property at the time and place of the crime." I.C. § 18-2402(11 )(a) (emphasis 
added). However, Mr. Lantz never testified as to how much he would have held the 
stolen equipment out for sale, as used, at the time of the theft. Cf Vargas, 152 Idaho at 
243-44 (stating that the company owner testified on how much he would have held the 
stolen used pipe sections out for sale). Thus, Mr. Lantz did not testify as to the market 
10 
value of the stolen equipment. See Smith, 144 Idaho at 693. Nor did Mr. Cundiff testify 
as to the market value of the stolen equipment on Mr. Lantz's claim. 
Similarly, the testimony from Mr. Galloway does not establish that the actual cash 
value reflected the price at which the stolen equipment on his claim would be held out 
for sale to the general public. Mr. Galloway determined the replacement value of the 
stolen property on his claim by going through a Cabela's catalog and "deduct(ing] what 
it was going to cost to replace the item." (Tr., p.88, L.14 - p.89, L.1.) Mr. Galloway 
also testified that all of his stolen equipment was used. (Tr., p.100, Ls.14-16.) Just like 
Mr. Lantz, Mr. Galloway never testified as to how much he would have held the stolen 
equipment, as used, out for sale. Cf Vargas, 152 Idaho at 243-44. Thus, Mr. Galloway 
did not testify as to the market value of the stolen equipment. See Smith, 144 Idaho at 
693. 
The testimony from Mr. Collins, the State Farm employee, does not show that the 
actual cash value of the stolen equipment was the market value. In fact, when asked 
what the actual cash value approximates, Mr. Collins responded: "The useful life left in 
a product." (Tr., p.125, Ls.18-21.) Mr. Collins's testimony did not establish that the 
"useful life left in a product" is equivalent to "the reasonable price at which the owner 
would hold those goods out for sale to the general public." See Smith, 144 Idaho at 
693. Thus, there was no substantial evidence that the actual cash value of the stolen 
equipment is the market value of the stolen equipment. 
Additionally, while the district court concluded that the market value of the stolen 
equipment was the actual cash value, it mischaracterized the process by which State 
Farm calculated the actual cash value. At the oral ruling hearing, the district court 
stated that "[t]he insurance adjuster testified as to the method by which he received the 
11 
value, which was essentially taking market value and deducting depreciation." 
(Tr., p.174, L.23 - p.175, L.24.) Later, the district court stated, "the insurance company 
paid for the items, and the amount that they are out is the market value that they are 
out. So the market value was determined essentially by the insurance company, which 
was the amount that it was held out to the general public, less the depreciation." 
(Tr., p.175, Ls.20-25.) 
However, State Farm determined the actual cash value for its payments not by 
taking the market value of the stolen equipment, less depreciation, but by taking the 
replacement value of the stolen equipment, less depreciation. (See Tr., 125, Ls.8-17, 
p.137, Ls.9-11.) As seen above, Mr. Lantz and Mr. Galloway determined the 
replacement value of the stolen equipment based on the price to replace the property 
with brand new items. (Tr., p.36, Ls.15-23, p.88, L.14 - p.89, L.1.) Thus, the 
replacement value should not be conflated with the market value of the used items that 
made up the stolen equipment. Further, State Farm never represented that it used the 
market value of the stolen equipment as the starting point for determining the actual 
cash value. 
In sum, the evidence presented to the district court did not show that the actual 
cash value was the reasonable price at which the stolen equipment would have been 
held out for sale to the general public. There was no substantial evidence from which 
the district court could fir:id that the actual cash value calculated by State Farm is the 
market value of the stolen equipment. Thus, the district court abused its discretion by 
not acting consistently with the applicable legal standards. 
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B. Substantial Evidence Established The Satisfactorily Ascertained Market Value Of 
The Stolen Equipment, And So The Restitution Ordered To State Farm May Not 
Be Justified As The Replacement Value Of The Stolen Equipment 
If the market value of stolen property cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the 
replacement value may be used to determine the amount of restitution to be ordered. 
I.C. § 18-2402(11)(a); Smith, 144 Idaho at 692. In this case, the actual cash value used 
in the district court's order of restitution to State Farm on Mr. Lantz's claim was largely 
identical to the replacement value, because State Farm did not take any depreciation on 
the replacement value figures provided by Mr. Lantz. 3 (R., pp.93-94.) The actual cash 
value used in the district court's order of restitution to State Farm on Mr. Galloway's 
claim was approximately five percent lower than the replacement value, because State 
Farm took about five percent depreciation on most of the replacement value figures 
provided by Mr. Galloway. (R., pp.63-64.) Thus, it could be argued that, if there were 
no satisfactorily ascertained market value for the stolen equipment, the restitution 
ordered to State Farm would be justified as an approximation of the replacement value. 
However, the district court here was not entitled to use replacement value or the 
roughly-equivalent actual cash value to order restitution to State Farm, because there is 
substantial evidence of the satisfactorily ascertained market value for the stolen 
equipment. 
The market value of the stolen equipment in this case is satisfactorily ascertained 
from the results of the auction of the stolen equipment. The stolen equipment sold at 
3 Due to the special limit for watercraft on Mr. Lantz's policy, State Farm paid Mr. Lantz 
$1,000.00 for the 12 foot smoker craft, even though Mr. Lantz provided a replacement 
value of $3,710.00. (R. pp.93-95.) Mr. Collins testified that the $3,710.00 figure was 
not accurate and estimated the replacement value of the boat was $1,700.00. 
(Tr., p.130, Ls.3-16.) However, that downward revision did not impact the benefits paid 
to Mr. Lantz on the boat. (Tr., p.134, L.25-p.135, L.7.) 
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auction for a total of $1,152.00. (R, pp.91-92.) Minus the commission fee of $230.40, 
State Farm received a total of $921.60 from the auction. (R., p.91-92.) The total of 
$1,152.00 from the auction is the market value of the stolen equipment because it is the 
"reasonable price at which the owner would hold those goods out for sale to the general 
public." Smith, 144 Idaho at 693. 
Testimony presented the district court established that the auction price is the 
market value of the stolen equipment. At the restitution hearing, Mr. Collins agreed that 
it would be "a fair statement to say that a very good kind of gut check or way to verify 
whether or not these replacement values and the actual cash value are accurate would 
be to test that in a market type of scenario .... " (Tr., p.138, Ls.11-15, 21.) "[M]arket 
type of scenario" meant "where people are given the opportunity to come in and bid at 
an arm's length buyer/seller relationship to get the price that a willing buyer and a willing 
seller is willing to come to an agreement at" - put otherwise, an auction. (Tr., p.138, 
Ls.16-23.) Under that scenario, and assuming that the auction was public and involved 
a number of buyers, Mr. Collins also agreed with the statement "what was actually paid 
per your main auction was a much closer reflection of the fair market value of those 
items than anything that was created with the subjective input of your customers." 
(Tr., p.138, L.25 - p.139, L.11.) Indeed, Mr. Galloway testified that there were lots of 
bidders at the auction of the stolen property. (Tr., p.102, L.23 - p.103, L.1.) Mr. Cundiff 
testified that he and "six or seven bidders" had bid on a boat at the auction. (Tr., p.72, 
L.22 - p.73, L.1.) 
The testimony concerning the auction indicated that the stolen equipment was 
held out for sale at a reasonable price to the general public. See Smith, 144 Idaho at 
692. Thus, the auction price for the stolen equipment is the market value. As seen 
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above, the total auction price was $1152.00. (R., p.91.) Bearing in mind that restitution 
may only be ordered "for any economic loss which the victim actually suffers," I.C. § 19-
5304(2), State Farm should not receive the total auction price. Because State Farm 
already reduced its financial obligation to Mr. Lantz by the $921.60 it received from the 
auction, (Tr. p.139, Ls.13-25), it should not be permitted to receive that same amount as 
restitution now. Therefore, the restitution order to State Farm should be reduced to the 
auction commission fee of $230.40. (See R., p.91.) 
However, evidence presented at the restitution hearing may indicate that, solely 
with regard to the stolen used goose decoys, the auction price is not "the market value 
of the property at the time and place of the crime." I.C. § 18-2402(11 )(a). Mr. Cundiff 
testified that the condition of the stolen used goose decoys had changed in the time 
between the theft and the auction. (Tr., p.62, Ls.13-25.) He testified that the stolen 
used goose decoys had been sanded, painted, or marked with an emblem and 
Mr. Vanslyke's phone number. (Tr., p.62, Ls.13-25, p.64, L.23 - p.65, L.8, p.70, Ls.1-
15.) Mr. Vanslyke also testified that he had sanded, painted, or marked some of the 
stolen used goose decoys. (Tr., p.165, L.15 - p.166, L.7.) Mr. Vanslyke testified that 
these changes "actually probably made them sell for more, if anything." (Tr., p.165, 
Ls.23-24.) 
The evidence that the condition of the stolen used goose decoys had changed in 
the time between the theft and the auction may indicate that the auction price of the 
stolen used goose decoys is not the market value at the time and place of the crime. 
This does not apply with regard to the rest of the stolen equipment, because there was 
no evidence presented that the condition of the rest of the stolen equipment had 
changed in the time between the theft and the auction. 
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Even if the market value of the stolen used goose decoys is not the auction price, 
the market value of the stolen used goose decoys is satisfactorily ascertained from 
Mr. Vanslyke's testimony presented at the restitution hearing. At the restitution hearing. 
Mr. Vanslyke testified he had experience with buying and selling used decoys, "having 
worked at a decoy manufacturer for several years and being an airbrush artist and 
hunting for 15 years .... " (Tr., p.148, Ls.1-5.) He also testified that there was a market 
for used decoys in the Treasure Valley. (Tr., p.147, Ls.19-21.) Based on his 
experience, Mr. Vanslyke estimated that a used decoy, within a year of purchase, lost 
"at least 50 percent" of its value compared to brand new. (Tr., p.147, L.22 - p.148, L.6.) 
He testified that a dozen new goose decoys would cost about $330.00, while a dozen 
used goose decoys, after he fixed them up, would cost about $150.00 on Craigslist. 
(Tr., p.151, Ls.5-12.) Further, Mr. Vanslyke stated that the stolen used decoys in this 
case "hadn't been refurbished." (Tr., p.151, Ls.20-21.) His testimony on the market 
value of used goose decoys was uncontroverted. 
Mr. Vanslyke's testimony on the market value of the stolen used goose decoys 
was similar to the testimony in Vargas on the market value of the stolen used pipe, 
which the Idaho Court of Appeals accepted as sufficient evidence of market value. Both 
the company owner in Vargas, 152 Idaho at 243-44, and Mr. Vanslyke, (Tr., p.147, 
Ls.19-21 ), testified that there were markets for the used items in their respective cases. 
Just as the company owner in Vargas testified that he could generally sell used pipe for 
60 percent of the price of equivalent new pipe, 152 Idaho at 244, Mr. Vanslyke testified 
that he could sell used goose decoys on Craigslist for 50 or 60 percent of the value of 
new decoys, (Tr., p.151, Ls.5-13.) Following Vargas, Mr. Vanslyke's testimony was 
sufficient evidence of the reasonable price at which the stolen used goose decoys 
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would have been held out for sale to the general public. Thus, the market value of the 
used goose decoys is satisfactorily ascertained from his testimony. 
The actual cash value for the stolen used goose decoys accounts for $3,318.864 
of State Farm's restitution request on Mr. Lantz's claim. (R., p.93.) Because 
Mr. Vanslyke's uncontroverted testimony was sufficient evidence of the market value of 
the stolen used goose decoys, the market value of the decoys is somewhere between 
$1,659.33 (50 percent of $3,318.66) or $1,991.20 (60 percent of $3,318.66). Again, 
restitution may only be ordered "for any economic loss which the victim actually suffers." 
I.C. § 19-5304(2). Because State Farm received $574.50 from the auction of the stolen 
used goose decoys, 5 its restitution in this scenario should be reduced to an amount 
between $1,084.83 ($1,659.33 minus $574.50) and $1,416.70 ($1,991.20 minus 
$574.50) for the stolen used goose decoys, well as the auction commission fee of 
$230.40 (to account for the rest of the stolen equipment). Thus, the total amount of 
restitution ordered to State Farm in this scenario should be between $1,315.23 
($1,084.83 plus $230.40) and $1,647.10 ($1,416.70 plus $230.40). 
4 The total of $3,318.86 for the actual cash value of the stolen used goose decoys 
breaks down as follows: $1,987.50 for five dozen full body goose decoys, $571.34 for 
three dozen half shell motion goose decoys, $526.82 for three dozen sleeper half shell 
goose decoys, and $233.20 for two dozen floater goose decoys. (R., p.93; see Deputy 
B. Minshall, Canyon County Sheriff's Office, Law Supplemental Narrative, p.2 (Mar. 9, 
2011) (attached to the PSI).) 
5 The total of $574.50 for the auction of the stolen used goose decoys breaks down as 
follows: $40.00 for Lot No. 1102 (12 stack goose decoy); $45.00 for Lot No.1103 (11 
stack goose decoy); $55.00 for Lot No. 1104 (12 stack goose decoy); $50.00 for Lot No. 
1105 (12 stack goose decoy); $1.00 for Lot No.1106 (box extra goose heads); $294.00 
for Lot No.1107 (21x full body goose decoys choice); $27.00 for Lot No. 1108 (3x goose 
decoys choice); $20.00 for Lot No. 1109 (goose decoys (non felt)/4); $25.00 for Lot No. 
1110 (rubber goose decoys/6); and $17.50 for Lot No. 1114 (goose decoy 
pile/accessories). (R., p.90.) 
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In sum, the district court was not permitted to use the actual cash value as an 
approximation of the replacement value of the stolen equipment when it ordered 
restitution to State Farm, because the market value of the stolen equipment is 
satisfactorily ascertained from the substantial evidence presented to the district court. 
CONCLUSION 
Substantial evidence did not support the conclusion that the amount of restitution 
ordered to State Farm, on the basis of actual cash value, was the market value of the 
stolen equipment. Further, there was substantial evidence of the satisfactorily 
ascertained market value for the stolen equipment. Because substantial evidence did 
not support the amount of restitution ordered to State Farm, Mr. Vanslyke submits that 
the district court abused its discretion when it ordered $7,834.77 in restitution. 
For the above reasons, Mr. Vanslyke respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
the restitution order and remand the matter to the district court with instructions to apply 
the proper legal standard and order restitution to State Farm, based on the evidence 
already presented, in an amount determined using Mr. Vanslyke's testimony as the 
market value of the stolen used goose decoys, and the auction price as the market 
value of the rest of the stolen equipment. 
DATED this 24th day of January, 2013. 
~ I° rL---- ?<-----
BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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